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Abstract 
The concept of ‘authorisation’ was one of the innovations under the (Imperial) Copyright Act 
of 1911. The concept, which has found its way into many common law countries 
jurisprudence, has been very crucial in imposing secondary liability on parties whose services 
have been used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right. However, the law of 
secondary liability is one of the areas badly understood under intellectual property rights. This 
position has been compounded by technologies which are of dual use. Though secondary 
liability for copyright infringement is a creation of statutes both in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, the courts have tried to delimit the scope of liability incurred by a party for 
authorising, sanctioning or ‘participating’ in an infringing act. Comparing the Nigerian 
position with that of the United Kingdom and Australia, this paper examines the scope of 
‘causes…to do’, an equivalent of the tort of authorisation, under the Nigerian Copyright Act 
2004. This paper argues that uncertainty around the current approach under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act might defeat the purpose of copyright to reconcile the right of the copyright 
holder and the right of unsuspecting technology providers whose facility might have been 
used to infringe.  
 
Keywords: Copyright; authorisation; Nigeria; “cause…to do”; secondary copyright liability  
 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of authorisation is one of the precursors to a finding of secondary 
liability where it is alleged that a defendant has sanctioned or initiated an infringing 
act. In respect of a copyright infringement, secondary liability includes an instance 
where liability is imposed on a person who does not actually commit or carry out the 
infringing act but has provided the means through which the infringement is 
committed (Angelopoulos 2013). In other words, copyright may be infringed not only 
where a defendant has exercised any of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder 
directly without consent, but also authorises or approves the doing of such act by 
another person (Caddick, Davies and Harbottle 2016, Riordan 2016).  The concept of 
authorisation has a long history in both the United Kingdom and Australian copyright 
jurisprudence where it has been invoked by copyright holders against manufacturers 
of copying technologies for providing members of the public with the means to 
engage in unauthorised reproduction and communication of their works (Bowrey, 
Handler and Nicol 2010). The emergence and the surge in the use of digital 
technology have brought about a renaissance of the concept when it was again 
invoked by copyright owners against internet service providers, software 
                                                          
* Although with modifications, this article forms part of the author’s PhD research at the School of 
Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom. While the PhD research focuses on the UK, the US 
and Nigeria, this paper explores the positions under Australia, the UK and Nigeria.  
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manufacturers and other internet intermediaries for the role in various copyright 
infringement cases (Landes and Litchman 2003, Pessach 2007).  
 
The creative industry, in Nigeria, has witnessed a tremendous growth in the last two 
decades. The industry, visibly represented by its music and entertainment sectors, 
does not only promote the image of the country overseas but it has also become a 
major source of revenue for the country. For example, the film industry known 
Nollywood is estimated to worth between $200 and $300 annually (BGL Research & 
Intelligence 2011) while the entire entertainment and media industries' revenues to 
grow at a compound annual growth rate of 16.1 percent from $4 billion in 2013 to an 
$8.5 billion in 2018 (PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. 2014). Interestingly, there has also 
been a considerable growth in the Internet usage in Nigeria. There were about 100, 
000 internet users in 1999 but this number rose to 11 million in 2008 and around 44 
million in 2010 (Freedom House 2011). This geometric growth could also be traced to 
the mobile phone usages and data services heralded by the further liberalisation of the 
telecommunication sectors (Freedom House 2011). While more Nigerians now have 
access to information through the Internet, some users have already deployed the 
platform towards various nefarious and illegal activities. Producers of music and films 
have rued financial losses attributed to the act of piracy (Fielding-Smith 2014).  
 
The concern of this paper is that internet intermediaries who are a gateway to online 
activities may be faced with secondary liability where it is alleged that they authorised 
or participated in the commission of the infringing act.  A concept analogous to 
‘authorisation’ is also recognised under the s15 of the 1988 Nigerian Copyright Act. 
Section 15 provides that ‘Copyright is infringed by any person who without the 
licence or authorisation of the owner of the copyright (a) does, or causes any other 
person to do an act, the doing of which is controlled by copyright.’ Despite the 
legislative provenance of this tortious wrong, the court has not attempted to interpret 
this provision making this area of law largely uncharted under the Nigerian copyright 
jurisprudence. This dearth of case law does not suggest that there are no incidences of 
secondary infringement; rather, in fact, the courts have side-stepped this provision or 
decided to follow other common law principles such as vicarious liability and agency 
in holding defendants liable. Cases like Island Records Ltd & Ors v John Holts 
Shipping Services1 and CBS Inc v Intermagnetic Co Ltd2 are instances of missed 
opportunity to interpret and develop the relevant statutory provision. 
 
Assuming Z had given Y a pen which was borrowed from Z to write a letter but Y 
used the pen to stab X in the course of a fight. Did Z cause Y to stab X because Z 
provided Y with the instrument for the commission of the wrongful act? It will be 
absurd to answer in affirmative because there was nothing to suggest that Z supported 
Y’s action. In the absence of a clear judicial pronouncement on the meaning and 
factors for the court to consider in finding liability for ‘cause to do', third parties and 
especially internet intermediaries are left to assume the nature and extent of their 
liability. The aim of this paper is to investigate the uncertainty surrounding the 
meaning of the phrase, ‘cause to do’ an act controlled by copyright under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act and the implications for both right holders and third parties accused of 
providing facilities for the infringements. The tort of authorisation has been decided 
upon by courts in the United Kingdom and Australia, and it has been extensively 
debated by the academics as it relates to copyright infringement. The positions in 
these two countries have become points of reference and precedents for other 
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common law countries with similar or equivalent provisions. As a result, this article 
will also explore the guidance that the Nigerian courts can get from both Australia and 
the United Kingdom in interpreting the phrase. Therefore, the first part of the article 
provides a concise summary of the Nigerian legal system, the rules of statutory 
interpretation and finally, the introduction of copyright law into the Nigerian legal 
system in order to establish the link it has with both Australia and the UK.  From both 
the UK and the Australian perspectives, the second part traces the evolution of the tort 
of authorisation. It examines the development of case law and the divergence under 
the two jurisdictions. It is not the aim of this article to discuss the breadth of all the 
cases addressing the concept of authorisation but selected ones which are relevant in 
drawing out the key elements that the courts have employed in distinguishing the tort 
of authorisation from mere facilitation. The third part addresses the uncertainty 
around the meaning of ‘cause to do’ and argues that the phrase whether interpreted 
narrowly or broadly will defeat the fundamental purpose of the copyright system 
which is to balance the interests of right holders and society in having access to 
creative work.  
 
The Nigerian Legal System and the Interpretation of Statutes in Nigeria 
The sources of law in Nigeria are the (Received) English Law, Nigerian legislation, 
Nigerian case law and customary law/Islamic law (Obilade 2002, Asein 2005). Early 
statutes in Nigeria which later became received English Law were introduced as part 
of the colonial rule. In 1861, when the Lagos Colony was annexed by the British 
Government, the English Law was formally introduced by Ordinance No 3 of 1863. 
In 1914 under the administration of Lord Lugard, the Lagos Colony, the Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgamated to 
become the geopolitical entity now called Nigeria. For the purpose of administration 
of justice, the colonial British established the Supreme Court, Provincial Court, and 
the Native Court. These courts, except the Native Court at their inception, operated 
English Law which encompassed the English common law, the statutes of general 
application and the rules of equity.3  
 
Section 45 of the Interpretation Act provided that the statutes of general application 
that were in force in England on the 1st day of January 1900 shall be in force in the 
Federation.4 It follows that any of the English statutes sought to be enforced in 
Nigeria must have been in force in England on 1 January 1900. It does not matter 
whether such statute has been repealed in England by another statute. For example, 
the Copyright Act 1911 continued to have force in Nigeria despite its repeal by the 
UK Copyright Act of 1956. It is important to note the difficulty in identifying which 
statute will constitute a ‘statute of general application’ in the absence of a definition 
under the Interpretation Act.5  Despite this, statutes such as Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act,6 Conveyancing Act 1881,7 Statute of Frauds 1677,8 and the Sale of Goods Act 
18939 among others have been held as statutes of general application. These statutes 
and those that have not been directly brought before the court will only apply as far as 
local circumstances allow.10 
 
Similarly, the common law of England and the doctrines of equity shall be in force 
within the jurisdiction. This provision has been interpreted to mean the English 
common law as well as the English doctrines of equity. This interpretation appears to 
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be too narrow and has the tendency to prevent the growth of a uniquely Nigerian 
common law and equity (Allot 1970). Should common law in the regard be read to 
include principles of English law as they have been adopted by other common law 
countries like the USA, Canada and Australia, among others? Allot was of the opinion 
that the term common law in reception statutes should be construed as ‘the common 
law of England’ and nothing more (Allot 1970). Another controversy on the 
application of common law relates to its dates. It is contended that in as much the 
enabling enact prescribes a date; the received law is the common law and doctrines of 
equity existing as of January 1, 1900. Thus, a court should search and apply only as 
they were as of this date. An opposing but better view suggests that what was received 
was the rule of common law and doctrines of equity as they are from time to time 
(Park 1963). It is important to understand that common law and doctrines of equity 
will continue to apply where there is no local enactment that has codified or repealed 
them. It remains to add that the principles of common law and decisions of English 
court continue to have a persuasive authority in Nigeria.11  
 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
Ambiguities and uncertainties about the meaning of words are unavoidable in the 
process of enacting a statute by the legislature. The objectives of legislative drafting 
are efficacy, efficiency, effectiveness and precision (Xanthanki 2014). However, Lord 
Denning noted that ‘the draftsman… conceived certainty but has brought forth 
obscurity; sometimes even absurdity’ (Denning 2005, 9). The reason being that in the 
context of copyright laws for example, legislatures are faced with a complex task of 
drafting copyright law which balances stakeholders’ rights when drafting law that 
responds to technological challenges (Bosher and Mendis 2016). In such an instance, 
the onus is on the courts to discover the intention of the legislature, the sententia legis, 
and resolve the ambiguity that may surround the meaning of the words used in a 
statute.  The court must “ascertain the meaning of the legislation through the medium 
of the authoritative forms in which it expressed” (Fitzgerald 2008, 132). Besides some 
presumptions of law, the Nigerian courts adopt other major common law principles or 
canons of statutory interpretation. They are the Literal Rule, the Golden Rule, the 
Mischief Rule and the Purposive Rule (Obilade 2002, Asein 2005). The Literal Rule 
requires statutes to be construed according to their literal meaning or in their usual 
grammatical sense where they appear to be clear and unambiguous.12 The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria in Mohammed Abacha v the Federal Republic of Nigeria13 
concluded that the duty of the court is to simply interpret the clear provision by giving 
the plain wordings their ordinary interpretation without more. The court of law is not 
expected to bend backwards to sympathise with a party in a case in the interpretation 
of a statute merely for a reason, that the language of the law seems harsh or is likely 
to cause hardship.14 Since words in themselves do not have any proper meaning, a 
court is required to adopt a contextual interpretation of such words as reflected in the 
legal maxim, noscitur a sociis that is, the meaning of an unclear word or phrase 
should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. Apart from the 
concern that Literal Rule may result in a miscarriage of justice as observed in R v 
Bangaza,15other notable drawbacks include that its rigid application may stifle social 
change through the law, perpetuate hardship or ignore the realities of modernisation.   
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To overcome some of these drawbacks, the courts do resort to another guiding 
principle known as the Golden Rule as established in Becke v. Smith.16 According to 
the principle, the court may follow the secondary meaning of a word where the 
adherence to the plain grammatical interpretation would lead to an absurd, 
inconsistent or ambiguous result.17 This principle is based on the assumption that the 
legislature could not have intended an absurd result.18 As such, Golden Rule 
recognises that there may be some internal disharmony or logical inconsistency either 
between parts of the same statute or between a statue and some other principle of law. 
In this respect, the court may construe the word “or” as “and” as it was in Ejor v 
Inspector-General of Police.19 In a similar vein, it is not in all instances that the court 
of law will interpret the word “shall” as mandatory, the court must examine the 
context within the word is used to the deduce the intention of the legislation. As 
posited per Muhammed JSC, ‘it is not always that the courts would interpret the word 
“must” (in Order 2 Rule (2) supra) or “shall” as mandatory, both words are 
interchangeable and can both mean ”may” where the context so admits.’20 
Considering the emphasis given to the Rules of the Court, what is not clear is whether 
his Lordship was suggesting a different interpretation standard for the Constitution 
and other statutes on the one hand and another for the Rules of the Court, on the other 
hand.21 It is, however, clear that the court of justice has a duty to try to get at the real 
intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to 
be construed.22 For example, in interpreting the s370 of the Nigerian Criminal Code, 
the court in R v Princewell interpreted the word “marries” not as contracting a valid 
marriage but as going through a form of valid marriage recognised by law.23 The 
leeway permitted in the Golden Rule does not grant the court the liberty to embark on 
an interpretative frolic but to confine itself within the precincts of the statute.  
 
When the literal rule or golden rule of interpretation leads to ambiguity or a mischief 
that makes the intention of the legislator uncertain, the court will look at other 
provision or provisions of the statute with preference to view aimed at avoiding a 
public mischief. The rule is known as Mischief Rule of interpretation or the rule in 
Heydon’s case. 24 Under the Mischief Rule, the court aims to determine the intention 
behind a legislation rather altering its expression. The court would examine the 
position of law when the statute was enacted, what the objective of the statute for 
which the old law did not address and the remedy provided by the statute to be 
construed. Like the Golden Rule, the court cannot read words into a statute unless 
reasons for doing so can be discerned in the statute itself.25  Because the Golden Rule 
is not a perfect cannon in itself, there is a new school of thought which favours what 
seem like a hybrid of the golden rule and the mischief rule. This hybrid is called the 
Purposive approach. Denning L.J. in Seaford Court Estates v Asher26 noted that: 
 
When a defect appears in an Act of the Parliament, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and 
blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of 
Parliament and he must do this not only from the language of the statute but also from a 
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was 
passed to remedy and then he must supplement the written word so as to give and life to the 
intention of the legislature.  
 
The purposive approach allows the court to look beyond the confines of the language 
as used in the statute and the position of the common law before it. It calls for a broad 
and liberal interpretation which will protect and preserve the dynamic character of the 
law and translate it into an instrument of social engineering. The move towards 
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purposive approach was supported by a retired Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court 
(Oputa 1996) who argued that: 
 
Law is like an old but vigorous tree which has its roots in the past, but takes on new grafts, 
puts on new sprouts, and occasionally drops dead wood. He is a better judge who accepts the 
challenges to be the husbandman [and who does] the necessary pruning, who accepts to adapt 
the existing law to a fast changing society. Such judge must shake off all the inhibiting legacy 
of the past and assume a dynamic role in interpreting the law to meet the realisation of all the 
human rights of our oppressed and disadvantaged citizenry. 
 
The attitude of the Nigerian courts to the purposive approach could be gauged in 
Garba v. Federal Civil Service Commission;27 Attorney General of Bendel State v. 
Attorney-General of the Federation;28 and Fawehinmi v. Akilu.29 Most of these cases 
focus on the interpretation of the country’s Constitution and other acts of the 
executive arms of the government. The judicial activism heralded by the purposive 
rule has been criticised by some members of the judiciary for amounting to a “naked 
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation”.30 
Another Honourable Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Ayoola J.S.C also noted 
that ‘Judicial lawlessness manifests in deciding cases knowingly in disregard of a 
well-known and established principles and arbitrary exercise of discretion...’ (Ayoola 
1998, 58). With due respect to his lordship, it appears that his lordship missed the 
modalities of the purposive approach. The purposive approach does not confine itself 
within the legislation only; it examines the legislative documentation and the history 
of the law to be construed. It, therefore, gives consideration to the social, the political 
or the economic conditions which necessitated the enactment of the legislation. The 
purposive approach advocates an interpretation of law according to the spirit of the 
law and not just its letters.  
The History of Statutory Copyright Protection in Nigeria 
It is a settled matter that statutory copyright law is a part of the colonial legacy in 
Nigeria. However, opinions are divided as to which copyright law was the first 
copyright statute in Nigeria. More writers regarded the Imperial Copyright Act of 
1911 which was extended to Nigeria pursuant to the colonial Order-in-Council dated 
24 June as the first copyright law in the country (Ocheme 2000, Adewopo 2002 and 
Asein 2012). Although a lone voice, Gana on the other hand, noted that the Literary 
Copyright Act of 1842 was the Nigeria's first contact with copyright law through an 
Ordinance that introduced English Law into Lagos in 1862 (Gana 1996). Whichever 
of the legislations is agreed as the first copyright legislation; both legislations had 
ceased to apply in Nigeria when they were repealed by the Nigerian Copyright Act of 
1970.31 The Copyright Act of 1970 was later repealed by the current Nigerian 
Copyright Law of 1988 as amended in 1992 and 1999.  
 
The emergence of the Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988 was motivated by the failure of 
the Copyright Act of 1970 to tackle appropriately the high rise in incidences of 
copyright infringements faced by copyright holders and the copyright-based industry 
as a whole.  Some of the provisions of the 1970 Act were found to be ineffective and 
inadequate to tackle and respond to the ‘realities of the age’ (Adewopo 2012). One of 
the drawbacks of the 1970 Act was the absence of criminal sanctions that could serve 
as deterrence to infringers. Shyllon argued that the Act create a false progress in the 
protection and encouragement of creativity in Nigeria (Shyllon 2003). (Gana 1996) 
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was also of the view that ‘[t]he creation of a “Nigerian” copyright decree did not 
foster Nigerian creativity, nor did it reflect Nigerian interest groups concerned about 
the development of an effective system of copyright protection.’ Gana’s view might 
have been influenced by the history of the 1970 Act as a military decree. In other 
words, it was promulgated as a Copyright Decree (No 61) 1970 which made it more 
of an imposed legislation and did not go through any democratic legislative process. 
Thus, the opportunity for a thorough review and the provision of comments by 
stakeholders did not form part of its promulgation.  The lobby and campaigns by the 
indigenous copyright industry culminated into Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988. Just 
like the 1970 Act, the 1988 Act was also promulgated as a decree by the military 
government headed by General Ibrahim Babangida.32 Similarly, the Copyright Decree 
47 of 1988 as the Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988 was then known was never 
subjected to the rigour of legislative vetting because the democratically elected 
legislative houses had been dissolved during the coups d'état that brought the military 
government to power. Arguably, the decree turned an Act may also have the same 
problem as its predecessor.  It should, however, be noted that some principles of the 
WIPO Tunis Model Law for Developing Countries drafted in 197633, Universal 
Copyright Convention and Berne Convention were influential in the drafting of the 
1988 Act provisions.  
 
Like both the Imperial Copyright Act 1911 and the Nigerian Copyright of 1970, the 
1988 Act continued to be founded on the orthodoxy of having to reward labour and 
encourage creativity, utilitarian and natural rights of the creator. Authors of literary 
works, musical works, artistic works, cinematograph films, sound recordings and 
broadcast are granted exclusive rights under the newly enacted law.34 Because these 
categories of works are exhaustive, no copyright can be claimed outside these 
categories except neighbouring rights which are also guaranteed under the Act. The 
restriction of copyright protection to the six categories may appear to have denied 
other works which are not specifically enumerated, however, the definitions of each 
category is very comprehensive to accommodate other varieties of works. For 
example, s.51 defines literary work to include computer programmes, choreographic, 
works, written tables and compilations.35 The Nigerian Supreme Court explains the 
nature of the right of a copyright holder in Plateau Publishing Co. Ltd. vs. Adolphy, 
where the court held that:  
 
  this legal right, though abstract in nature, vests the holder with the sole and exclusive privilege  
of multiplying copies of his creative work by publishing, selling or disposing of the same as it 
pleases him for a stated period of time.36 
 
Before being granted copyright protection, any of the classifications will not be 
eligible for copyright unless sufficient effort has been expended to give the work 
certain level of originality and fixed in a known or later to be developed medium of 
expression.37  The exclusive rights mentioned above were made subject to exceptions 
among which are fair dealings for research, private use, and criticism or review or the 
reporting of current affairs. 38 
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From “cause…to do”' to “authorisation” 
United Kingdom  
In the United Kingdom, the discourse around the concept of authorisation of 
copyright infringement began when the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911 repealed 
about seventeen previous Acts and amended some sections of four other Acts.39  
Although the introduction of the word “authorise” was deemed to be redundant and 
superfluous by the court in Performing Right Society v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate 
Ltd40, some writers contended that it was an innovative act which expanded the 
jurisprudence on secondary copyright infringement. For example, the editor of W A 
Copinger, Law of Copyright explained that:  
 
it would seem that the new Act has enlarged the protection accorded to the owner by making it 
part of this monopoly to authorise any of the acts referred to in sub-sect (2) of section 1 and 
that a person may be liable to an action for infringement of copyright if he has, without 
consent of the owner of the copyright, ‘authorised’ any of these acts, although the authorised 
act has not been completed. 41 
 
Thus, where the defendant had announced, by means of posters and handbills, their 
intention to exhibit a cinematograph film in which the plaintiffs had the copyright, at 
certain theatres, it was held that the defendant  had authorised ‘a performance of the 
film’ within the meaning of s.2(1) of Imperial Copyright Act 1911.42 Another 
important effect of the introduction of ‘authorise’ is to extend the scope of copyright 
liability beyond the agent-principal or master-servant relationship. Earlier, the court in 
interpreting ‘cause to be represented and performed’ had held in Russell v Briant,43 a 
case decided under the Dramatic Copyright Act of 1833 that: 
 
No one can be considered as an offender against the provisions of the Act so as to subject 
himself to an action of this nature, unless by himself or his agents he actually takes part in a 
representation which is a violation of copyright.44 
 
The holding in Russell was rejected for being too narrow in Evans v E Hulton & Co 
Ltd.45 Currently, s.16(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides that 
‘[c]opyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the 
copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the 
copyright’.  
 
Whilst the nature of the relationship between the authoriser and the actual infringer 
has been broadened, the meaning of the term, ‘authorisation’ was not immediately 
clear since none was provided in the United Kingdom’s Copyright Act 1911.  
Adopting the decision of Tomlin J. in Evans v E Hulton & Co Ltd46 and the dicta of 
Buckley L.J. in Monckton v Pathé Frères Pathephone Ltd47, Bankes L.J., in Falcon v. 
Famous Players Film Co. Ltd 48 held that the word ‘authorise’ in the Copyright Act 
1911 was to be understood in its ordinary dictionary sense of ‘sanction, approve and 
countenance’.49 The definition was extended by Atkins L.J. who stated that to 
‘authorise’ means ‘to grant or purport to grant to a third person the right to do the act 
complained of, whether the intention is that the grantee shall do the act on his own 
account, or only on account of the grantor’.50 However, Sir Hugh Laddie argued that 
‘this so-called definition replaces one vague expression by an equally vague one’ 
(Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria 1995). This writer is also of the view it is difficult 
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reconciling the two definitions by their Lordships in Falcon.  The terseness of Bankes 
LJ’s definition would require further clarification. One of such clarifications would be 
whether the authorisation must be expressed or implied. Also, it is not clear whether 
the phrase “sanction, approve and countenance” 51 should be construed conjunctively 
or disjunctively. The Court of Appeal in Pensher Security Door Co Ltd v Sunderland 
City Council52 was of the view the phrase should be construed conjunctively while the 
subsequent adoption of the definition in the Australian case of Winstone v Wurlitzer 
Automatic Phonograph Co of Australia Pty Ltd53 prefers a disjunctive reading.  
Furthermore, unlike the meaning of authorisation as ‘sanction, approve and 
countenance’ which favours a broad view, it appears that Atkins LJ definition of ‘to 
grant or purport to grant’ tends toward a narrower approach.  A narrow approach may 
suggest that the defendant must have an actual or legal authority before they can be 
liable for authorising an infringement.  If this is the position, this definition will be too 
restrictive in imposing liability. Be that as it may, since Falcon, a body of law has 
emerged from the definition.  
 
The ability of the defendant to control or prevent the commission of the infringement 
is a crucial factor in finding liability for authorisation. In CBS Inc v Ames Records & 
Tapes Ltd54 the court was provided with another opportunity to clarify the definition 
of authorisation put forward in Falcon’s case. It was held that: 
 
An authorisation can only come from somebody having or purporting to have the authority 
and that an act is not authorised by somebody who merely enables or possibly assists or even 
encourages another to do that act, but does not purport to have any authority which he can 
grant to justify the doing of the act.55  
 
In the case, the question was whether the operation of a record lending scheme by the 
defendant amounted to authorisation of home taping by borrowers. The defendant had 
set up a record lending library which members of the public could join for a fee. The 
plaintiffs contended that through the scheme, the defendants were seeking to make 
money out of ‘home taping’ of sound recordings, knowing that such home taping was 
likely to occur and that the defendants were thereby "authorising" infringement of the 
plaintiffs' copyright. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court held that the mere 
knowledge that borrowers were likely to tape the records could not amount to 
‘authorising’ infringement of copyright where there is no evidence of ability to 
control the infringing act. Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude that the 
defendants had granted or purported to grant any right to home tape. It appears that 
what the CBS Inc case suggests is that there must be a sort of authority that the 
defendant must possess before they can be liable for authorisation of infringement and 
the defendants would only be liable when they make use of this authority, or they hold 
themselves out as someone having that power. There must be certain conduct by the 
defendant which endorses the infringing act. It could also be argued that this decision 
supports the maxim of nemo dat quod non habeat. In other words, the defendant must 
have the requisite authority or pretends to have authority before he could be liable for 
authorisation. Finally, this decision seems to distinguish authorisation from mere 
facilitation or assistance.  The indifference exhibited by a defendant may not 
necessarily translate into authorisation this might just mean that the defendant does 
not think there is an obligation to interfere or prevent infringement but that of the 
right holder.  
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The thin line between authorisation and facilitation of infringement came to the fore 
in C.B.S. Songs Ltd. v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc.56 The court approved the 
earlier definition of authorisation as meant to grant, or purport to grant the right 
complained of either expressly or by implication and held that the defendants by 
selling a high-speed twin-tape recorder might have facilitated the copying by 
purchasers of material in breach of copyright but did not necessarily "authorise" it. It 
was roundly rejected that the advertisement by the defendants constituted a form of 
authority for unlawful copying and that it is not sustainable to conclude that the 
defendants have the authority to grant that permission. In the court’s opinion, the 
decision whether to record or play and what is to be recorded or play lies entirely with 
each user of the facility and the defendant has no control over the use of their models 
once they are sold.  Possibly, what Lord Templeman meant was that though the 
defendant might have conferred on the purchaser the ‘power’ to copy but did not grant 
or purport to grant the ‘right’ to copy.57  It is the view of this author that this decision 
was motivated by the need to support the development of technology. One of the 
concerns of lawmakers and the court has been how to reconcile the use of technology 
and protection of copyright ownership. To neglect this need for a balance, may tilt 
copyright protection in favour of holders and thereby leading to restriction of access 
to information and which can also hamper technological growth. As Lord Templeman 
observed, even if the defendants decided not to introduce the technology of double-
tape double-speed into its products, other manufacturers would in all likelihood have 
done so.  Therefore, the UK courts appeared to have adopted a narrow approach 
compared to the Australian jurisdiction which is later examined below. The view 
common in these two cases is that a person may not necessarily authorise an 
infringement though he placed into the hands of an alleged infringer the means by 
which the infringement is committed if those means can be used for other legitimate 
purposes. More importantly, it makes no difference if it is obvious that the means will 
be used to infringe.  
 
It may appear that attempts to formulate a definition for 'authorisation' have been 
over-flogged or exhausted. Later UK decisions seem to suggest that evidence of 
culpable conducts is important to distinguish between facilitation and authorisation. 
As it would appear, the ghost of the infamous US case of A & M Records v Napster58 
has been resurrected in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin Ltd.59 In 
Newzbin Ltd, it was alleged that the defendant company operated a website which 
allowed users to engage in illegal file-sharing and thereby among other things 
authorised the infringements of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted materials. The subscribers 
of the defendant were given access to Usenet, a platform that allows Newzbin users to 
upload and view messages on an electronic equivalent of public bulletin boards. 
Newzbin’s subscribers were of two categories namely those with a basic membership 
and those on the premium membership for a fee. Premium members could download 
the contents of files gathered using Newzbin. Having examined early cases on the 
subject matter, the court found the approach in the Australian case of RCA 
Corporation v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd60 too wide and affirmed the definition of 
“authorise” as the grant or purported grant of the right to do the act complained of 
which the court concluded is more than mere enablement, assistance or 
encouragement.  In order to hold an alleged authoriser liable, it was held that regards 
must be had to certain factors namely: nature of the relationship between the alleged 
authoriser and the primary infringer; nature of the equipment or other material 
supplied whether constitutes the means used to infringe; whether it is inevitable it will 
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be used to infringe; the degree of control which the supplier retains, and any steps 
taken to prevent the infringement.  
 
On the issue of the relationship between the defendant and its subscribers, there was a 
contractual agreement between the parties which gave the premium subscribers 
special treatment. Also, they have access to a special searching facility such as 
searching by reference to genre, sub-categories and through the genre. The nature of 
the facility goes beyond indexing and categorisation, but it additionally provides 
extensive support in identification and compilation of materials sourced. This 
configuration provides means for infringement and was a creation of the defendant 
and was well within the defendant’s control.  In respect of preventing the infringing 
act, the defendant did not only fail to exercise the ability to control the infringing act 
but actively encouraged users to make reports on the movies retrieved with rewards 
for doing so.  This decision has been criticised for reverting to the already rejected 
definition of authorisation to mean sanction, approve countenance in Falcon’s case 
(Angelopoulos 2013). While this may be true, the court should be commended for 
providing some guidelines for the first time on activities which may evidence 
authorisation of infringement. The problem with these guidelines is whether the 
presence of one of the factors would be sufficient to find a liability or whether all 
must coexist. The latter position might be preferable. For example, the etymology of 
authorisation as a legal principle has demonstrated a move away from Russell v Briant 
holding.61 However, isolating other factors like the nature of the equipment or the 
influence of supplier might defeat the objective of copyright protection system itself 
which is to balance the interest of holders to compensation and the right of the society 
to access the product of the authors’ creativity.  
 
The position of the court in Newzbin is replicated in Dramatico Entertainment 
Limited v BSKYB62, a case addressing the liability of the infamous “Pirate Bay” file 
sharing site for authorising and communicating to the public copyrighted materials 
of a group of record companies. Dramatico Entertainment represents the first case 
where British courts were asked to award injunctions against ISPs in respect of 
peer-to-peer network using the BitTorrent file sharing protocol.  The claimants had 
sought an injunction against the defendants under s97A of the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 198863 requiring the Defendants to take measures to block or at 
least impede access by their customers to the Pirate Bay’s (TPB) peer-to-peer file-
sharing website. The Pirate Bay website enables users to upload, share and 
download various works in which copyright subsists.  The defendants, major UK 
ISPs, were not the actual infringers they merely provided access to the internet and 
the website among other online facilities. They are not the actual provider of the 
tool for infringement. Although the actual secondary infringer was The Pirate Bay 
though no action was brought against it.  On the evidence, it was not difficult for the 
court to establish a case of primary infringement which was an essential factor for 
authorisation of infringement. On whether The Pirate Bay authorised the infringing 
acts, Arnold J. relied on the dictum in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v 
Newzbin Ltd where of Kitchin J highlighted five important factors to establish 
whether there is an authorisation or not.  For the purpose of emphasis, these factors 
are: (i) the nature of the relationship, (ii) the means used to infringe; (iii) 
Inevitability of infringement; (iv)the degree of control, and (v) steps to prevent 
infringement. After analysing each of the factors, Arnold J found Pirate Bay 
operators liable for authorising the copying of the plaintiffs’ work and 
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communicating them to the public. The act of the website operators transcended 
merely enabling or assisting the acts of the users. Most importantly, the court noted 
about the operators of Pirate Bay that 
 
…[t]hey "sanction, approve and countenance" the infringements of copyright committed by 
its users. But in my view, they also purport to grant users the right to do the acts complained 
of…. I would add that I consider the present case to be indistinguishable from 20C Fox v 
Newzbin in this respect. If anything, it is a stronger case.64  
 
The decisions in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin Ltd and 
Dramatico Entertainment Limited v BSKYB  have found approval in approval in 
Paramount Home Entertainment International Limited v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd,65 and 1967 Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd66 Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp v Sky UK Ltd (Popcorn Time)67 among others.   
 
Riordan, although agreed with the finding of liability in both Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corporation v Newzbin Ltd and Dramatico Entertainment Limited v BSKYB, 
criticised the opinion of the court that Newzbin and Pirate Bay users might be under 
the impression their supplier of services possessed authority to grant permission in the 
infringed copyrighted materials. Such an assumption has “the appearance of fiction.” 
(Riordan 2016). The assumption of authority is not sustainable because evidence 
showed that users of the facilities knew they had no authority from the copyright 
owners. Besides, the whole concept of authorisation will be rendered useless where a 
website dealing in exclusively infringed materials includes a disclaimer that it has no 
authority.  
 
Nonetheless, as already observed instead of being preoccupied with a precise 
definition for ‘authorise’, the focus has now shifted to the activities of the defendant 
and other factual circumstances surrounding the allegation of infringement.  
 
Australia 
In Australia, the concept of authorisation has also had a lengthy history in the 
country’s copyright jurisprudence. It is another jurisdiction where the concept has had 
extensive consideration by the courts. This jurisdiction is important considering the 
divergence of its interpretation of the authorisation when compared to the United 
Kingdom and Canada. The tort was first introduced under the Australian Copyright 
Act of 1905 which was repealed in 1912.68 It is worth nothing that ‘authorisation' is 
one of the areas where Australian law developed in advance of its UK counterpart and 
provided a template for the subsequent 1911 Imperial Copyright Act. In the amended 
Australian Copyright Act of 1968, s36 provides that:    
 
Subject to this Act, the copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed 
by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of 
the copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in 
the copyright. 
 
Similar to the legislative approaches in the United Kingdom, neither the 1968 Act nor 
any of its predecessors provide a definition or guidance on the meaning of 
authorisation.  While these legislations and cases which later developed from its 
interpretation may have shared legal ancestry, there is more of divergence in the 
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breadth and scope of definitions offered.  What resonates clearly and follows the 
position in the United Kingdom is the ambit of ‘authorise’ which has been held to be 
wider than that of a principal-agent relationship in WEA International v Hanimex. The 
case concerned allegation that the defendant through an advert authorised the 
infringement of plaintiff’s copyright. The defendant’s advert stated that “if you don’t 
want your favourite recordings ruined use FUJI GTI care tapes”. Gummow J. 
affirmed that “[t]he introduction of the concept of ‘authorisation’ plainly was 
designed to meet perceived deficiencies in existing legislation”.69 If it had been 
otherwise, the court observed the plaintiffs in cases like Sarpy v Holland70 would 
have been left without a remedy.  
 
The divergence in the concept of authorisation is more reflected not just in the 
meaning but in its application by the courts of both Australia and the United 
Kingdom.  In Australia, the leading authority on the authorisation of copyright 
infringement is the High Court decision in University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse.71 The defendant, an educational institution was alleged to have 
authorised the infringement of the plaintiff's copyrighted literary works by placing in 
its library a photocopying machine which allowed the university’s students to make 
photocopies of the plaintiff’s work without the latter’s permission. In holding the 
defendant liable for authorising the infringement of the plaintiff's copyright, the 
Australian court with approval, adopted the meaning of authorisation of the English 
court in Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co. Ltd 72 and held that the word "authorise" 
in section 36(1) of the Copyright Act is used in the sense of "sanction, approve, 
countenance". Although there was no evidence of express permission given by the 
university to the students, the court inferred implied invitation based on indifference, 
exhibited by acts of omission. Per Jacobs J, the court concluded that: 
 
[T]he word has a wide meaning which, in cases of permission or invitation, is 
apt to apply both where an express permission or invitation is extended to do 
the act comprised in the copyright and where such permission or an invitation 
may be implied. 
 
So, Australian courts have widened the meaning of authorisation to cover 
‘permission’ and ‘invitation’. Applying the decision in Performing Right Society v. 
Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate,73 the court added that the word "authorise", in addition to 
meaning "sanction, approve, countenance" can also mean "permit".  Later in RCA 
Corporation v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd,74 the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
approved the definition in Falcon but gave the concept a different application. It 
appears that the Australian approach suggests that it is immaterial whether a person 
has a control or not, a person may be said to authorise another to commit an 
infringement if such a person is “responsible for placing in the other's hands materials 
which by their nature are almost inevitably to be used for the purpose of an 
infringement."75 This Australian decision has adopted a broad view compared to the 
British decision in CBS Inc v Ames Records & Tapes Ltd. The conclusions in both 
Moorhouse and RCA Corporation have not been favourably received in the United 
Kingdom. Whitford J was unambiguous in declaring the proposition to be ‘stated 
much too widely’ and the House of Lords Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc v 
British Phonographic Industry Limited76 also rejected this broad application.77  
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In 2000, the Copyright Amendment (Digital) Agenda was introduced among others 
things to provide further guidance on the element constituting infringements listed in 
s101 of the Australian 1968 Copyright Act. About authorisation of infringement, 
s101(1A) reads thus: 
 
In determining, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether or not a person has authorised the 
doing in Australia of any act comprised in a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part without 
the licence of the owner of the copyright, the matters that must be taken into account include 
the following:  
(a) the extent (if any) of the person's power to prevent the doing of the act concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person who did the act 
concerned;  
(c)  whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the 
act, including whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.  
 
Although the Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright Amendment (Digital 
Agenda) Bill 2000 suggested that the aim of the legislation was to codify the decision 
in Moorhouse case, it has however been argued that the amendments in s101(1A) are 
a departure from this claim (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2006). The Federal Court of 
Australia on appeal considered the application of the above section in Cooper v 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd78. Previously, the lower court had held that a 
website operator and an internet service provider were both liable for authorising 
copyright infringement about a website that provided hyperlinks to sound recordings. 
The defendant operated a highly structured website with hyperlinks that enabled users 
to access and download music files. The website also had tools which allow users to 
include new links on the site. In dismissing the appeal against the decision of the 
Federal Court, it was found that there was an ongoing relationship between the 
defendant and the visitors to the websites. The defendants generated revenue from 
advertisements which were linked to the number of visits to the website.  Also, the 
defendant did not take reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the use of his website for 
copying copyright sound recordings. Although there were disclaimers against 
copyright infringement, these steps were unreasonable and mere cosmetic steps which 
lacked the intention to genuinely prevent infringement. In dismissing the appeal, the 
court held that authorisation would be inferred where the relationship between the 
defendant and the alleged infringer is such that the defendant stands to gain 
financially from the infringing acts or activities leading to the infringement.79 
 
Conversely, where there was evidence of copyright infringement on a large scale, the 
court in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd80 held that the ISP, iiNet the did not 
authorise the infringing acts of its subscribers. The case against the defendant was the 
authorisation of the infringement of the claimants’ films and television programs 
being carried out by the defendant’s customers, through the use of the BitTorrent 
protocol. In finding no liability for authorisation, the court gave three reasons. First, 
the copyright infringement did not occur as a result of the iiNet provision of access to 
the internet but because of the use of the BitTorent system.  As the court explained, 
‘the “means” by which the applicants' copyright is infringed is an iiNet user's use of 
the constituent parts of the BitTorrent system.’81 Since the defendant has no control 
over the BitTorrent system, it is wrong to attribute the liability of infringement arising 
from the operation of the BitTorrent system to the defendant. The decision severs the 
two technologies under consideration – the BitTorrent and the access to the internet 
which is not the actual means of infringement. Second, iiNet did not have the 
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necessary “power to prevent infringement”. Schemes such as notification, suspension 
and termination of customer accounts do not fall within the relevant power to prevent 
copyright infringement pursuant s101(1A)(a) of the Copyright Act. It could be argued 
that this second reason follows from the first. The power to prevent will arise from the 
power to control. Third, on evidence iiNet did only provide an internet service to its 
users, it could not be said to have sanctioned, approved or countenanced copyright 
infringement. This position is clearly different from the defendants in Cooper’s case 
in which the respondents intended copyright infringements to occur, and in 
circumstances where the website and software were deliberately structured to achieve 
this result. 
 
Nigeria: The Jungle of ‘Causes to do.' 
 ‘Causes any other person to do’: Too clear or too ambiguous?  
As already observed, the legislative provenance of ‘cause to do', as a form of 
infringement could be traced to pre-1911 copyright legislations. If we adopted the 
argument of Ruth L. Gana on the history of copyright legislation in present day 
Nigeria, it is appropriate to assert that ‘cause…to do’ has been part of Nigerian 
copyright legislation since 1842. As already discussed, the English Literary Copyright 
Act of 1842 was introduced to Nigeria when the Ordinance No 3 of 1863 extended the 
Laws of England to the Lagos colony which was created in 1862 until it was 
displaced by authorisation as provided under the 1911 Act.82 When the Copyright Act 
of 1911 was passed in the United Kingdom, in pursuant to its s28, it was made part of 
the Nigerian law. Except where the cases interpreting the provisions are overruled by 
subsequent decisions or by a statute, such decisions continue to be the law in Nigeria.  
 
As already mentioned, s15 of the Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988 provides that 
copyright is infringed by any person who without licence or authorisation of the 
owner of the copyright- (a) does or cause any other person to do an act, the doing of 
which is controlled by copyright…’ This provision is reminiscent of the wording s11 
of the 1970 Act, which was earlier noted departed from the concept of authorisation 
introduced by the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911. Therefore the doctrine of “cause to 
do” which had been rejected was re-imported with applicable case law interpreting 
into the Nigerian legal system under the s15 of the Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988.  
 
Either under the 1970 Act or the 1988 Act, none of the superior courts of records in 
Nigeria has attempted to define the breadth of liability that may be imposed on a third 
party where they are alleged to have supported or participated in the act of 
infringement. What is nature of the relationship between a secondary infringer and the 
actual infringer? The uncertainty created by this lacunae could only be better grasped 
in a hypothetical case.  As noted in the introduction of this paper if Z had lent Y his 
employee a pen to write a letter but Y, however, used the pen to stab X in the course 
of an argument, it will be absurd to conclude that Z caused Y to stab X without doing 
nothing more. In other words, Y had the authority to use the pen to write his letter but 
not to use has a weapon of attack or defence. Z lacked control over what Y will do or 
is doing with the pen apart from requesting for the pen to be returned.  The position 
would be different if Y requested for the pen in the course fighting with X and Z 
knew the intention of Y. The case may not be straightforward where the object Z gave 
Y is capable of one use but Z did nothing more than placing the object in Y hands and 
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Z was not aware of the intent of Y. Holding Z responsible for the action of Y may 
result in the much criticised Australian decision in University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse.83 Therefore, it is submitted that unless ‘cause to do' is given a purposive 
interpretation; the phrase may be too broad will encompass such acts like facilitation, 
inducement, permission, aid and abet, persuasion, incitement, and procurement among 
others as the hypothetical case suggests. Looking at decisions like Russell v Briant, it 
may also be too narrow to incorporate those who may have the perceived authority to 
grant the right to infringe but who are not in a master-servant relationship with the 
primary infringer.  The court, adopting a purposive rule of interpretation, could lean 
on the history of the Nigerian Copyright Act of 1988 in ensuring it cures the mischief 
which necessitated the Act and not just focuses on the existing case law.  
 
Further uncertainty about the phrase could be gleaned when examined in relation to 
the right conferred on copyright owners. In granting exclusive rights to owners of 
copyright, the Act provides that ‘in the case of a literary or musical work, to do and 
authorise the doing of any...’.84 It is also used for infringement in respect of artistic 
works,85 and cinematograph films.86 Surprisingly, in enumerating the actual acts of 
infringement, the Act reverts to ‘cause to do’. Two conclusions could be made at this 
point. First, the Act has used ‘authorise’ and ‘cause to do’ interchangeably and 
synonymously. The effect of this is that ‘cause to do’ may mean ‘sanction’ in the 
context of infringements listed under s15. Second, another effect lies in the fact that 
‘cause to do' could be interpreted as separate or another form of infringement from 
‘authorisation' for two reasons. The concept of authorisation was introduced to 
address some of the deficiencies identified in the interpretation of ‘cause' as already 
noted. It will be absurd to conclude that the intention of the drafters of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act is to limit the liability for infringement to a master-servant relationship 
only. This logical inconsistency will defeat the purpose of the legislation except the 
court considers the Golden Rule approach which allows the court to consider the 
secondary meaning a word may have. However, there is no court decision in Nigeria 
that has considered the meaning of authorisation. If no cut off date is placed on the 
applicable common law which forms part of the imported law, the court may then 
benefit the interpretations from both the United Kingdom and Australia examined 
above. While there is nothing preventing Nigerian courts to look at these decisions, 
they remain persuasive authority until they are legislated or expressly adopted by the 
Nigerian Supreme Court.87  
 
Another uncertainty could be inferred from the order of appearance of both ‘authorise' 
and ‘cause…to do'. Under legislative interpretation in Nigeria, the approach is to 
resolve any inconsistency between two legislative provisions in the same statute in 
favour of the latter provision. If this interpretative approach is not followed, it may 
appear that the intent of the Act is to distinguish the instances where a person has an 
actual authority or right with ‘authorisation' from ‘causing to do' which amounts to 
‘unauthorised authorisation'. This is further supported by s31 which protects the 
expressions of folklore. That section has protected the expressions of folklore against 
reproduction, communication to the public, adaptations, translations and other 
transformations. Specifically, subsection 31(4) mentions the right to authorise these 
acts the power of which is vested in the Nigerian Copyright Commission. In respect 
of the right of broadcasting right, s9(1) provides that: 
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Where the owner of the copyright in any literary, musical or artistic work authorises a person 
to incorporate the work in a cinematograph film and a broadcasting authority broadcasts the 
film, the owner of the copyright shall, in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary 
between the owner and that person, be deemed to have authorised the broadcast.  
 
From the above, it is submitted that ‘cause to do’ in s15 will not be synonymous 
authorise as used in s6 and other parts of the Act.  
 
This legislative uncertainty was identified by Ogunkeye when examining the nature of 
copyright infringement under the repealed Nigerian Copyright Act 1970 (Ogunkeye 
1992). Drawing from an unreported case in which he, Ogunkeye was the plaintiff’s 
counsel, the writer observed the absence of clear guidance on what may constitute 
‘causes another person to do under the legislation and case law. The writer drew 
inferences from the decisions from the English case of Amstrad Consumer Electronics 
Plc v British Phonographic Industry Limited88 and the Moorhouse v University of 
New South Wales89 and concluded that: 
 
In general, it must be noted that the Nigerian statute differ from the English and Australian 
Acts in that these Acts specify “authorise” whilst our Acts states “caused”. It can, and it has 
been successfully argued that in most situations, the two words are synonymous. However, 
there exist decisions where that indicate that they are not totally synonymous (Ogunkeye 
1992). 
  
Though both "authorise" and "causes…to do" may be interpreted as being 
synonymous, this does not mean that the position is correct in the light of the 
legislative history and already examined court decisions. As already explained above, 
it should also be noted that both United Kingdom and Australia have the interpreted 
authorise differently. While the UK has adopted a narrow approach, the Australia 
approach is broad.  
 
‘Causes any other person to do’: Too narrow or too broad? 
 
If ‘cause to do’ is to be interpreted strictly following pre-1911 copyright legislations 
and decisions, it is obvious from the above that the legislation will suffer from a 
restrictive construction of the statute. In the context of online infringers, apparently, 
the relationship between many copyright infringers and technology providers cannot 
always be circumscribed within the principal-agent or master-servant relationship. In 
such instances, the relationship may be contractual, vendor-purchaser, distributor or 
provider of technology and end-user or customer. It may also be possible that an 
authoriser has no knowledge of the infringer and the relationship between them is too 
remote and may be unfair to attribute the act to the technology provider.  
 
On the meaning of the phrase, the Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary gives the 
meaning of  ‘cause’ as   ‘to make something happen' whilst the Oxford Thesaurus 
suggest synonyms such as ‘bring about’,  ‘give rise to’,  ‘result in’ ‘induce’ or 
‘inspire’.90 There are two problems in relying on the dictionary meaning of ‘cause'. 
First, in its ordinary dictionary or literal meaning ‘cause’ has a negative denotation 
unlike ‘authorise’ which is neutral and could encompass both positive and negative 
acts.  Second, using thesaurus synonyms may not give an accurate meaning of the 
word in the context of the provisions of the Act.  Arguably, it is clear that the use of 
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the word ‘cause’ under the s15 of the Nigerian Copyright Act suggests that the Act 
expects the defendant to have actively influenced the infringing act. It is in this 
instance that it could be argued that the defendant actually induced or brought about 
the infringement. On the other hand, it is not quite clear if an omission or wilful 
blindness to the infringing act will fall within the meaning of the phrase. Cooper v 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd91 and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v 
Newzbin Ltd92 are decided on the positive acts of the defendants in encouraging 
infringement. Conversely, the absence of positive act or active inducement in 
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd93 is a factor in finding no liability for 
authorisation.   
 
Finally, is the presence of authority or power to control a requisite factor for liability 
based on ‘cause to do’? Authorisation can be inferred from command or permission, 
and this distinguishes it from procurement (Carty 1999). It may be argued that ‘causes 
to do’ does not necessarily connote presence of authority as demonstrated in the 
dictum of Whitford, J that “an authorisation can only come from somebody having or 
purporting to have authority…” 94 Considering the synonyms, ‘bring about’, ‘give rise 
to’, ‘result in’ ‘induce’ or ‘inspire’, it is doubtful if ‘authority’ is a relevant or a 
mandatory factor. It is possible to induce an act without having authority to do so.  
This is supported by the provision of 31(4) provides the right to authorise the 
reproduction of expression of folklore when compared with ‘imports or causes to be 
imported under s15(b) under the Nigerian Copyright Act.  The provision of s31(4) 
requires an actual or apparent authority from the authoriser while this may not be the 
case for ‘cause’. Unless there is a narrow purposive interpretation making ‘authority’ 
a relevant factor, it will be possible to subsume acts like enablement, assistance, 
incitement and authorisation under ‘cause to do’.  Such a broad reading will miss the 
fine distinction between the ‘provision of access’ from the ‘provision of means of 
infringement’ as it was in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd95       
 
Conclusion 
The concept of authorisation has continued to evolve since it was introduced to 
address the liability of persons that might have been responsible for others’ acts of 
infringement. Though with some difficulties, the concept has been found useful in 
addressing the liabilities of online intermediaries. The recent interpretation and 
application of the concept, in both Australia and the United Kingdom, appears to be 
moving towards the same direction. On the other hand, the concept of ‘cause to do’ 
has been stifled since it was replaced in the Imperial Copyright Act 1911 and 
continued to remain shrouded in legislative uncertainty in a country like Nigeria. The 
reason for this is not far-fetched from the absence of unequivocal and contemporary 
judicial pronouncement providing the needed clarity.  
 
While it may be easy to find liability for secondary copyright liability based on the 
common law doctrine of vicarious liability, the breadth and scope of ‘cause to do’ will 
be less than certain when if forms the ground of allegation of infringement by a 
plaintiff. This uncertainty will be further complicated when the liability relates to 
online infringement where the defendant has only provided the means but not 
necessarily authorising or condoning the act of infringer. Any application of decisions 
on the pre-1911 Copyright Act will be too narrow and without a doubt leave a 
plaintiff without a remedy. On the other, a broad reading will fail to identify the fine 
line between authorisation and facilitation or enablement. This distinction has been 
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found to be important in not exposing technology provider to a blanket of liability. In 
summary, it is submitted that the lawmakers should reimport the doctrine of 
authorisation in the Nigerian copyright jurisprudence to replace the current phrase of 
‘cause to do’ and also provide factors which will guide the court when finding 
liability authorisation of copyright infringement.   
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